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THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S AUTHORITY TO
EXAMINE CONTRACTOR BOOKS AND RECORDS AFTER
BOWSHER V. MERCK AND COMPANY: THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
STEVEN W. FELDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1951, Congress amended the Armed Services Procurement Act1 and
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act2 to permit the Comp-
troller General to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of a con-
tractor, or any of its subcontractors, that "directly pertain to and involve
transactions relating to" negotiated government contracts.3 Government
agencies require by regulation inclusion of the access provision in federal
contracts. For example, Defense Acquisition Regulation 7-104.15 mandates
that, with minor exceptions, the access clause be included in all negotiated
defense appropriated fund contracts in excess of $10,000.' Ordinarily, the
Comptroller General uses this inspection power to examine 100-150 contracts
annually.5 As one commentator has emphasized, "It is important to note that
the [access] clause does not give the Government the right to do anything
more than examine ... books, documents, papers, and records. [The clause]
* Attorney/Advisor, Civil Law Branch, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Gordon,
Georgia. B.A., SUNY at Stony Brook, 1975; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1978. Admitted to prac-
tice in New York and Tennessee. This Article reflects only the author's personal opinions and
does not represent the views of the Department of the Army or any of its instrumentalities. The
author expresses his appreciation to his wife Ann Feldman, and to the personnel of the Office of
the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Gordon and, in particular, Sid Brody, LTC Ron Frankel, LTC
Art Millard, CPT Jim Lynch, CPT Chuck Thebaud, Janice Neskorik, Linda Grise, and Shirley
Wallace, for their advice and assistance during the preparation of this Article.
The Armed Forces Procurement Act of 1947 is presently codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14
(1976).
' The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 is presently codified at 41
U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (1976).
3 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976). 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) incorporates nearly identical language. The
1951 amendments can be found at 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) and 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) respectively. These
statutes constitute the United States' permanent authority and the various federal agencies have
promulgated regulations implementing the applicable statute. See, e.g., Defense Acquisition
Regulation 1-100 et seq. In April, 1984, all federal agencies will adopt a uniform procurement
regulation, the Federal Acquisition Regulation. See The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
Amendments of 1979, 41 U.S.C. §§ 401-12 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); Gov't. Contractor, April 15,
1983, at 112.
See also Federal Procurement Regulation 1-7.103-3 (same standard in non-defense govern-
ment contracts); cf. Army Regulation 230-1, The Nonappropriated Fund System, 2 January 1975
(allowing inspection by contracting officer of all contractor books and records in contracts ex-
ceeding $2,500). 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) and 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) both contain little used exceptions for
certain foreign purchases and for contracts in which the agency determines the clause is un-
necessary. See SCHNITZER, infra note 5, at 2.
5 SCHNITZER, ACCESS TO CONTRACTOR RECORDS, 79-6 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR BRIEFING
PAPERS 6 (Dec. 1979).
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does not authorize any price reductions or withholding of payments."'
Nonetheless, the contractor's willful failure to allow inspection may result in
contractor debarment under appropriate agency regulations.7
The Comptroller General is the chief officer of the General Accounting
Office, a unique independent agency within Congress that has general re-
sponsibility for overseeing federal expenditures.' Prior to 1980, the Comp-
troller General could enforce the access to records statute only by suing for
specific performance of the contract. Today, the General Accounting Office
may rely on its subpoena power under 31 United States Code section 716 to
compel enforcement in a United States district court. Also, the United States
has means besides the Comptroller General's access power to audit contrac-
tor books and records.'
By definition, the access statutes apply only to prime negotiated con-
tracts as opposed to formally advertised contracts." In Bowsher v. Merck and
Co.,"1 the Court defined the two modes of contracting:
The Government employs two methods of procurement: advertised pro-
curement, ie., formal solicitation of competitive bids, and procurement by
negotiation. A negotiated procurement is the method authorized by statute
for use in situations in which the formal advertising and bidding procedure is
deemed impractical or unnecessary. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a); 41 U.S.C. § 252(c).
In procuring by negotiation, the government agency discusses the terms of
the procurement with one or more contractors and awards the contract to the
party offering the terms most advantageous to the Government."2
Congress so limited the Comptroller General's inspection power because
Congress believed that the major contractor abuses occurred with negotiated
procurements.13 Although formal advertising is the preferred method of con-
'Id. at 3.
E.g., Defense Acquisition Regulation 1-605.2(b)(1).
See generally, Cibinic and Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts,
38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349 (1970); Comment, The Comptroller General's Authority to Examine
the Private Business of Government Contractors: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1148, 1148 (1979). The recently revised Title 31 of the United States Code contains the statutory
authority for Comptroller General supervision over federal expenditures.
, E.g., Defense Acquisition Regulation 7-104.41(a) permits Department of Defense inspection
of all negotiated contracts and of formally advertised contracts exceeding $100,000. See also
Federal Procurement Regulation § 1-3.809. For a general review of the government's audit
powers, see Fenster and Lee, The Expanding Audit and Investigative Power of the Federal
Government, 12 PuB. CONT. L.J. 193 (1982).
1 SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 214 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891
(1983).
" 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983).
12 Id. at 1590, n.2.
'3 See infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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tracting,4 75 percent of government contracts are actually negotiated con-
tracts."5
Although variations exist, the government employs two basic modes of
contract pricing: fixed price and cost-plus a fixed fee. "A pure fixed price con-
tract requires the contractor to furnish the goods or services for a fixed
amount of compensation regardless of the costs of performance, thereby plac-
ing the risk of incurring unforeseen costs of performance on the contractor
rather than the Goverment."'" In a basic cost-plus contract, the Government
awards the contractor a predetermined profit along with the contractor's al-
lowable costs of performance.17 A negotiated contract may be fixed price or
cost based; a formally advertised contract may be only fixed price."
The Comptroller General's inspection power is a highly significant area
of federal procurement law in light of the massive amounts of money Con-
gress spends annually on government contracts. In fiscal year 1982, for exam-
ple, the Department of Defense alone spent 124.7 billion dollars for procure-
ment. 9 The Comptroller General's power under the access statutes has also
attracted a growing body of scholarly commentary.2
In Bowsher v. Merck and Co.," the United States Supreme Court held
that, as a general rule, these statutes permit the Comptroller General to in-
spect only those cost records directly attributable to a government contract,
such as direct material, labor, or manufacturing costs.' The Court further
* See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976).
'* SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 1981).
* Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587, 1589 n.1 (1983) (citing 1 R. NASH & J. CIBINIC,
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 413 (3rd ed. 1977)). [hereinafter cited as NASH & CIBINIC].
' NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 16, at 431-32.
, Defense Acquisition Regulation 2-104; 3-401; Federal Procurement Regulation 1-2.104-1;
1-3.401.
25 GOV'T. CONTRACTOR 114 (Apr. 1983).
Fenster and Lee, The Expanding Audit and Investigative Power of the Federal Govern-
ment, 12 PuB. CONT. L.J. 193 (1982); Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Con-
gress to Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1279, 1362-65 (1973); Note,
Government Contracts and the Comptroller General's Investigatory Power Under the Access-to-
Records Statutes: Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 579 (1981); Note, Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Staats: An Undue Expansion of the GAO's Investigatory Power under the Access-to-
Records Statues, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 122 (1979); Comment, The Comptroller General's Authority to
Examine the Private Business Records of Government Contractors: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1148 (1979); Comment, Government Contracts: Contractor's Obligation to Allow
Examination of Records under 10 U.S.C. § 2813(b), 72 DiCK. L. REV. 687 (1968).
21 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983).
Id. at 1596. The reported cases discuss only the Comptroller General's authority to ex-
amine contractor cost data. See infra note 24. The language of the access statutes would also allow
Comptroller General examination of non-cost data directly pertinent to the contract. Thus, the
Bowsher court indicated that the access statutes also would permit verification that the contract
1984]
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held that the policies underlying these access statutes ordinarily forbid Com-
ptroller General scrutiny of indirect, nonallocated costs, such as research and
development, marketing, or distribution costs." In reaching this statutory in-
terpretation, the Court resolved a split among the circuits offering sharply
divergent views of the Comptroller General's inspection power.'
A careful analysis of these statutes and their legislative history shows no
such distinction between direct and indirect contract costs. Instead, Congress
intended that the Comptroller General should have records access to all con-
tractor cost data having a substantial connection to contract price. This Arti-
cle therefore argues that the Bowsher Court's distinction between direct and
indirect contractor costs reflects an unduly restrictive interpretation of the
Comptroller General's statutory audit authority. Further, the Article sug-
gests that Congress follow Justice White's separate opinion in Bowsherl and
amend the statutes to allow Comptroller General review of contractor cost
records when (1) these costs likely had a substantial impact on contract price
and (2) the Comptroller General's request is reasonable.
First, the statutes and their legislative history will be examined. Second,
the majority and separate opinions in Bowsher will be analyzed. While giving
necessary attention to lower court cases interpreting the access statutes, the
Article will concentrate on the separate opinions in Bowsher as a vehicle for
examining the Comptroller General's audit power. This emphasis is ap-
propriate for two reasons: first, the facts are nearly identical in the reported
was performed in accordance with the terms. 103 S. Ct. at 1599. See supra text accompanying
notes 1-21.
2 Id. Contractor costs can be direct or indirect, allocable or nonallocable. Direct costs have a
close relationship to a particular product or service and they are, by definition, attributable or
allocable to a particular contract. Indirect costs have a more remote relationship to a product or
service and usually are nonallocable to a particular contract under traditional accounting prac-
tices. If, however, the contractor makes a special effort to assign its indirect costs to a particular
product, these indirect costs become allocable to that contract. Defense Acquisition Regulation
15-202 and 203. Defense Acquisition Regulation 15-201.4(iii) expands the traditional definition of
"allocability" to include costs necessary to the overall operation of the business, although a direct
relationship to any particular cost objective cannot be shown. Further, it bears emphasis that no
distinction exists between "allocated" and "allocable" costs. Both data are equally discoverable.
See Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1597 n.18 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
24 See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891
(1983); Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom.;
Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983); Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 620 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam), affd by an equally divided Court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981); United States v. Ab-
bott Laboratories, 597 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1979); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968). The above is a complete listing of the circuit cases inter-
preting the access statutes. For a discussion of these divergent views, see infra note 71.
' 103 S. Ct. at 1599. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Burger and Brennan joined Justice O'Con-
nor's majority opinion. Justice White joined by Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion as did
Justice Blackmun joined by Justice Stevens.
[Vol. 86
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cases; and second, the Bowsher opinions contain the most complete analyses
of the competing legal and policy arguments. Finally, the Article proposes a
model inspection statute that strikes a more reasonable accommodation bet-
ween the Comptroller General's need to evaluate government procurement
techniques and the contractor's right to business privacy.
II. THE ACCESS STATUTES AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The access statute which applies to all Department of Defense contracts
states in pertinent part:
[E]ach contract negotiated under this Chapter shall provide that the Comp-
troller General and his representatives are entitled, until the expiration of
three years after final payment, to examine any books, documents, papers, or
records of the contractor or any of his subcontractors, that directly pertain to,
and involve transactions relating to, the contract or subcontract.2
The access statute which applies to most other government contracts
states in pertinent part:
All contracts negotiated without advertising shall include a clause to the
effect that the Comptroller General of the United States ... shall until the ex-
piration of three years after final payment have access to and the right to ex-
amine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the con-
tractor or any of his subcontractors related to such contracts or subcontracts."
The Comptroller General's statutory inspection power originated from an
amendment to emergency legislation passed during the Korean War to assist
defense contractors faced with defaulting on fixed-price contracts because of
runaway inflation and severe shortages in raw materials. In January, 1951,
Congress alleviated the problem by giving President Truman emergency
authority to renegotiate government contracts. Concomitantly, Congress
enacted an access to records clause to prevent contractors from exploiting
the increased prices granted under the emergency authority.28 This legisla-
tion was only temporary, however, and Congress soon considered a perma-
nent version of the Comptroller General's inspection power.
Representative Hardy was the sponsor of both the temporary and
permanent codifications of the Comptroller General's audit authority.
Representative Hardy was greatly concerned that government contracting
officers were negotiating contract changes under the permanent procure-
10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976).
41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976). The Comptroller General's right of access under this statute and
10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976) starts before "final payment", which payment occurs when the contract
is substantially completed. SHNITZER, ACCESS TO CONTRACTOR RECORDS, 79-6 GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACTOR BRIEFING PAPERS 5 (Dec. 1979). The three year period may be tolled, however, for records
relating to disputes or litigation. See, e.g., Defense Acquisition Regulation 7-104.15.
Act of January 12, 1951, Pub. L. No. 921, 64 Stat. 1257-58.
1984]
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ment statutes while lacking the authority to inspect contractor books and
records.' During the debates on this legislation in October, 1951, Represen-
tative Hardy explained the purposes of his bill:
In normal times, competitive bidding generally operates as a brake on the
price which a contractor can demand from the government for his goods and
services. However, these are not normal times, and it should be obvious to all
of us concerned with the expenditures of billions of dollars for national defense
that we must establish every reasonable safeguard against waste and ex-
travagance in the spending of these vast sums. Under conditions as they now
exist, competitive bidding has little or no effect upon contracts which are
negotiated without advertising. As a result, when a contract is being
negotiated, here is a typical illustration of what usually happens. A contractor
with years of experience comes to the conference table accompanied by a
highly competent accountant and an equally competent lawyer. The govern-
ment representative on the other side of the table will, in a great majority of
the cases, be at a tremendous disadvantage from the standpoint of both train-
ing and experience, no matter how conscientious and honest he may be. So,
aside from any intentional liberality on the part of the Government con-
tracting officer, there is every chance in the world that the government will
come out on the short end of the deal. The bill would at least enable the agent
of the Congress to check the transactions from both the Government records
and the contractor's books.
The major purposes of the bill are two-fold: one, to give the Comptroller
General the proper tools to do the job Congress has instructed him to do, and,
two, to provide a deterrent to improprieties and waste in the negotiation of
contracts.3'
This excerpt from the legislative history demonstrates "(t)hat Congress
envisioned use of the access authority as an adjunct to the Comptroller
General's statutory responsibility to 'investigate ... all matters relating to
the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds' and to 'make
recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expen-
ditures.' "I'
Representative Hoffman opposed the original bill, which provided Comp-
troller General access to "pertinent records involving transactions related to
the contract. ' 3 2 He voiced a general concern that this language would permit
the General Accounting Office to examine company records totally unrelated
to its government contracts. Representative Hoffman therefore introduced
97 CONG. REC. 13198 (1951).
Id. Representative Hardy then gave some examples illustrating the breadth of his pro-
posed legislation.
"' Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587, 1593 (1983) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1974) and 31
U.S.C. §§ 60, 65(a) (1976)).
97 CONG. REC. 13371 (1951).
13 Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring and
dissenting) (analyzing legislative history), aff'd sub nom., Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct.
1587 (1983).
[Vol. 86
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a floor amendment modifying "pertinent records" to "directly pertinent
records.' ' Representative Hardy agreed to the amendment and the bill
passed without debate.' Significantly, contrary to later statutory interpreta-
tions, no legislator proposed a direct cost/indirect cost dichotomy as a limit
on the Comptroller General's audit powers.
Despite the vigorous debate surrounding this legislation, the statute
lacked extensive judicial interpretation for more than fifteen years. In 1967,
however, a United States Senate subcommittee began conducting hearings
on profits in the pharmaceutical industry that would set the stage for a legal
battle that would continue for more than a decade.
III. BOWSHER v. MERCK AND CO.
A. Prelude
In 1967, a United States Senate subcommittee initiated hearings on com-
petition in the drug industry.' During those hearings, the Comptroller
General appeared as a witness in 1971 and Senator Nelson suggested to him
that the General Accounting Office should use its audit power to investigate
whether the drug companies were making excess profits under government
contracts. By 1974, the General Accounting Office and subcommittee staffers
commenced a joint effort to obtain company cost and profit data pursuant to
a general economic study of the industry. After the General Accounting Of-
fice failed to obtain the information from the companies voluntarily, the Com-
ptroller General issued identical demands to six drug companies-Eli Lilly
and Company, Abbott Laboratories, Bristol Laboratories, Merck and Com-
pany, SmithKline Corporation, and Hoffman-LaRoche-requiring access to:
All books, documents, papers and other records directly pertinent to the con-
tracts, which include, but are not limited to (1) records of experienced costs in-
cluding costs of direct materials, direct labor, overhead, and other pertinent
corporate costs, (2) support for prices charged to the Government, and
m 97 CONG. REC. 13377 (1951).
SId.
In 1967, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Comptroller
General's statutory inspection powers in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013 (9th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968). In Hewlett-Packard, the facts were practically iden-
tical to those in Bowsher: The Air Force had awarded Hewlett-Packard (HP) four negotiated firm
fixed price supply contracts containing the standard access to records clause. These contracts pro-
vided for the sale of standard commercial items HP sold in substantial quantities to the general
public. The contract price was based on the company's previously established catalog price minus
a volume discount. The Comptroller General subsequently requested inspection of HP's cost and
pricing data and supporting documentation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion that the company's records of direct materials, direct labor and overhead costs were "directly
pertinent" to HP's government contracts.
Hearings on Competition Problems in the Drug Industry Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 8020 (1971).
19841
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(3) such other information as may be necessary for use to review the
reasonableness of the contract prices and the adequacy of the protection af-
forded the Government's interests. '
The first five companies ultimately sought to enjoin the General Accounting
Office inquiry; the sixth company, Hoffman-LaRoche, settled the demand
without litigation 9
Merck and Company (Merck) requested declaratory and injunctive relief
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent
the Comptroller General from examining the requested cost data., The
district court first analyzed the nature of the contracts. As in the pro-
curements with the other companies, Merck and the United States had
entered into several negotiated firm fixed price supply contracts containing
the standard access to records provision. The products manufactured under
these contracts were standard commercial items the company sold to the
public in substantial quantities. The contract price was based on Merck's
catalog price and there were no actual negotiations on price.41 Under these
circumstances, Merck's cost and pricing data were exempt from the
Renegotiation Act and the Truth in Negotiations Act."
T Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1590. For a more detailed account of the history
leading to the instant litigation, See id., supra note 23, at 586 n.4; SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 483
F. Supp. 712, 716-17 (E.D. Pa. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 668 F.2d 201 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
Comment, The Comptroller General's Authority to Examine the Private Business Records
of Government Contractors: Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1148, 1160 n.12 (1979).
" Merck and Co. v. Staats, 529 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 665 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
affd sub nom., Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983). The drug companies' strong op-
position to Comptroller General inspection of their indirect costs probably reflects the companies'
resentment that the Comptroller General was attempting to invade their management
prerogatives as opposed to his auditing traditional accounting data. See SHNITZER, supra note 5, at5.
41 The Bowsher Court later observed that the Government had:
no reason to suspect that Merck had engaged in any fraud or impropriety in connection
with the negotiation or performance of these contracts .... Nor does the Government
have any reason to believe that prices charged under these contracts were unreasonable
in any way .... In fact, the prices under each of the contracts were the lowest price at
which Merck sold each of the products at the time the contracts were awarded.
103 S. Ct. at 1598 n.21.
' Under the former Renegotiation Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1211-24 (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
which expired in 1978, the United States had a general right to demand inspection of contractor
books and records in contracts exceeding $100,000 so that the Government could detect and
recover excess profits. In 1954, the Act was amended to exempt contracts involving standard com-
mercial items. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1216(e)(1)(A) and 4(B). This mandatory exemption was predicated
on the belief that "ft]here is in most cases no basis or need for renegotiation since cost and pricing
experience has already been acquired and prices made in a competitive market." Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013, 1014 n.2 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968). The
Act also contained other mandatory and permissive exemptions. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1216 (1970
and Supp. V 1975).
Under the Truth in Negotiations Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1980), contractors have a general
[Vol. 86
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Following the reasoning in the related case of Bristol Laboratories v.
Staats43 , the district court granted the Comptroller General access to all
books and records relevant to the company's direct costs, including Merck's
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor and
fringe benefits, quality control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (in-
cluding plant administration, production, planning, warehousing, utilities and
security), royalty expenses, and delivery costs."" The district court pro-
hibited the Comptroller General from examining the company's indirect
costs, including Merck's data relating to research and development,
marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration, except as these
costs were allocable to a particular government contract. 5 The district court
obligation to offer the Government accurate, complete and current actual or estimated cost and
pricing data for negotiated contracts exceeding $500,000 or for the modification of any contract or
subcontract over $500,000. The Act contains permissive exemptions, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f), for con-
tracts where the price is based on adequate competition, set by law or regulation, or stems from
the established catalog price for a standard commerical item sold in substantial quantities to the
general public. See Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concur-
ring and dissenting), affd sub nom., Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983) (citing Sperry
Flight Systems Div. of Sperry Rand Corp. v. United States, 548 F.2d 915, 920-21 (Ct. Cl. 1977))
(noting permissive nature of exemption). Defense Acquisition Regulation 3.807.3(d), which im-
plements the Act, authorizes contracting officers to obtain this data in negotiated contracts
valued between $25,000 and $500,000. Furthermore, the statute contains its own examination of
records clause as well as a provision for reducing contract payments to reflect the contractor's im-
proper failure to furnish appropriate data. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f).
The Truth in Negotiations Act and various criminal and civil statutes are the United States'
other major tools to remedy contractor fraud, waste, and extravagance. See, e.g., The False
Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976); The False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); and The
Forfeiture of Fraudulent Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1976). See also Army Defense Acquisition
Regulation Supplement 1-608.50 (authorizing contracting officer to withhold payments incident to
ongoing contract if he suspects contractor fraud).
13 428 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), affd by an equally
divided Court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
" By definition, "direct costs" are those costs directly attributable to a particular contract.
Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1597. See also supra note 23. Every court of appeals
similarly had ruled that the Comptroller General has the right to inspect contractor costs at-
tributable to a government contract. Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1599 n.1. (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (analyzing cases).
1 529 F. Supp. at 3. Other indirect costs commonly include company taxes and profits. Merck
and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting), affd
sub nom., Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983).
The allocation problem arises when the company maintains cost records for all contracts
without any breakdown for government or nongovernment contracts. For example, if Company A
spends one million dollars annually for advertising all of its products, and the company fails to
keep a record of how much it spent for a particular product, it would seem impossible to deter-
mine how much money the company spent advertising any single product. A commentator ex-
plains the difficulty of attributing nonallocated indirect costs to a particular product:
No doubt some portion of the data contained in the records would be relevant to costs
associated with producing items for government contracts. Isolating that small portion,
however, may be impossible.
It is legitimate to assume that costs often will be unallocable. Businesses faced with
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further ordered that the Comptroller General ensure the confidentiality of
Merck's price data and prohibited public disclosure of Merck's books and
records with limited exceptions. 6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia affirmed the lower court's decision in a one page per curiam opinion.,7
While noting the growing body of case law and the divergent views among
the circuits, 8 the court concluded that "conflicts in these decisions must be
resolved by the Supreme Court, not by us, and we believe that nothing would
be gained by a replowing of the field."'9 Judge Mikva, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, undertook an extensive analysis of the Comptroller
General's inspection power under 10 United States Code section 2313(b) and
41 United States Code section 254(c).0 Judge Mikva concluded that these
statutes and their legislative history supported the Comptroller General's re-
quest to examine all records of contractor costs having a significant connec-
tion to contract price, including the company's indirect cost data.51
The United States thereafter sought certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that Merck's indirect cost records were also subject
to the Comptroller General's statutory inspection power. Merck similarly re-
the task of assigning research and development costs to products must grapple with the
fact that these costs may have no discernible relationship to particular products. Indeed,
a survey conducted by the National Association of Accountants found that, while some
businesses do assign research and development cost to particular products, they are
forced to use broad and arbitrary bases for allocation. Many other companies do not
assign these costs at all because the arbitrary method of allocation that would be
necessary would not provide a useful guide for determining pricing or product pro-
fitability.
Insofar as meaningful allocation is not possible, the GAO's demand for certain cost
records inevitably would require the contractor to divulge aggregate cost data pertain-
ing to a wide range of products, nor just those relevant to the governmental transaction.
Note, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats: An Undue Expansion of the GAO's Investigatory Power Under
the Access-to-Records Statutes, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 122, 132-33. Accord, Bristol Laboratories v.
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388,1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 620 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1981), affd by an equally
divided Court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
" The Merck district court implicitly held that Merck's confidential proprietary data and
trade secrets were also subject to General Accounting Office review. 529 F. Supp. at 4. The
district court allowed possible public disclosure of Merck's data if the information could be
disseminated without identifying Merck as the manufacturer or if Congress issued a lawful writ-
ten request to the Comptroller General for receipt of these materials. Id. Similar confidentiality
restrictions on Comptroller General review can be found in other cases. E.g., SmithKline Corp. v.
Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 207 n.4 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
', Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981), affd sub nom., Bowsher v. Merck
and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983).
Id. at 1237; see supra note 24.
" 665 F.2d at 1237.
Id. at 1237-50 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting).
1 Id.
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quested certiorari, contending that the Comptroller General's access demand
was unconnected to any congressionally authorized purpose and that the
company's direct cost records were not "directly pertinent" to the contracts
at issue.
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor's five-member majority opinion initially focused on the
language of the statutes and the meaning of the phrase "directly pertain to
and involving transactions relating to the contract."52 The majority determin-
ed this language meant simply that there must be "some close connection be-
tween the type of records sought and the particular contract."' Concluding
that the statutory language contains no further guidance on the class of
discoverable records, Justice O'Connor turned to the "[w]ell-settled canon of
statutory construction that, where the language does not dictate an answer
to the problem before the Court, we must analyze the policies underlying the
statutory provision to determine its proper scope." The majority opinion
therefore examined the statutes' legislative history to determine the con-
gressional intent.
The Court interpreted the legislative history as containing two
equivalent and conflicting statutory purposes: one, giving the General Ac-
counting Office extensive powers to detect fraud, waste, and extravagance in
federal procurement and, two, limiting General Accounting Office intermed-
dling in the contractor's private business affairs.5 Accordingly, the Court
balanced these conflicting policies in addressing the specific contentions
raised by the parties.
Justice O'Connor first analyzed the Government's contention that Merck's
indirect costs55 were directly pertinent to these fixed-price negotiated con-
tracts. She also noted the Government's reasoning that "Merck's indirect costs
are directly pertinent ... because Merck uses the payments made under these
contracts to defray indirect expenses."'5 Nevertheless, the majority rejected
this argument, reasoning that the Government's interpretation would "com-
pletely eviscerate the congressional goal of protecting the privacy of the con-
tractor's business records."" Under the Government's definition of "directly
' Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1592.
63 Id.
Id. at 1592 n.7 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 517 (1982)).
103 S. Ct. at 1593. Several contractors previously had argued without success that the
legislative history evidences only a narrow, anti-fraud objective. See Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665
F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting). The Bowsher Court finally
put this contention to rest. 103 S. Ct. 1592-93, 1598-99.
v See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. at 1594.
'Id.
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pertinent", the Court reasoned, the contractor must allow inspection of such
remote costs as the purchase of raw materials for totally unrelated products. 9
"In short, the Government's proposed definition of the statutory language ad-
mits of no doctrinal limitation, effectively reading the Hoffman limiting
language and its 'anti-snooping' policy out of the statute."6
The majority next examined the Government's argument that "GAO's
consistent and long-standing interpretation of its authority under the access
to records statutes supports the view that indirect cost records are subject
to examination under the fixed price contracts in question ... ."' In making
this argument, the Government was relying on the established principle that
a court will give great deference to an administrative agency's construction
of a statute within its mandate unless the agency's interpretation is clearly
incorrect."2 Justice O'Connor rejected this argument on two bases. First, the
Court pointed to legislative history indicating that the General Accounting
Office on several occasions had admitted serious doubts about its statutory
power to examine contractor indirect cost data. 3 Second, the Court ruled
that, even conceding the agency's long-standing interpretation, the agency's
position conflicted with the terms of 10 United States Code section 2313(b)
and 41 United States Code section 254(c).4
11 Id. Opponents of broad Comptroller General inspection powers have added that govern-
ment contracts often constitute a minuscule portion of a company's business and therefore the
company should be free of "limitless governmental foraging." United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, 597 F.2d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 1979) (Pell, J., concurring).
' 103 S. Ct. at 1595.
61 Id.
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). Further, Congress presumably both knows of the agency's in-
terpretation and adopts the agency's position as its own. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435
U.S. 110, 131 (1978); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
" The Court noted that in 1967, the Comptroller General had concluded that the access
statutes contain no authority for the General Accounting Office to examine contractor records
concerning nongovernment business, even if this inquiry would help to determine whether a con-
tractor sold a catalog price item in substantial quantities to the general public. 103 S. Ct. at 1595.
In 1969, the General Accounting Office informed Congress that the statutory inspection authority
excluded review of a contractor's nongovernment business and that a legislative amendment was
necessary to conduct an industry profit study. Id. (quoting 115 Cong. Rec. 25800-01 (1969)). Fur-
ther, in 1970, the General Accounting Office circulated an internal memorandum expressing the
agency's belief that a statutory amendment was necessary to examine contractor indirect cost
records. 103 S. Ct. at 1596.
The Bowsher Court acknowledged that the General Counsel of the General Accounting Office
in 1963 had claimed broad authority to audit all relevant contractor cost data. Id. (analyzing Hear-
ings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the Subcomm. for Special In-
vestigations of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963)). Also, the
Comptroller General had rendered a broad reading of his inspection powers in an unpublished
1962 opinion. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-149259 (7 Dec. 1962) (unpublished).
103 S. Ct. at 1595.
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The Court next discussed Merck's contention that direct costs were not
"directly pertinent" to the contracts because these agreements were not
cost-based and because the contracts were negotiated without regard to
price: 5
Direct costs certainly pertain directly to even a fixed price contract, for direct
costs are, by definition, readily identifiable as attributable to the specific pro-
duct supplied under the contract. Consequently, as a rational businessman, the
contractor will have some regard for these costs in setting even a catalog
price in order to avoid a loss on the product. Because these costs therefore
have a very direct influence on the price charged the Government, the GAO
would need to examine records of these costs to determine whether the con-
tractor is making an excessively high profit or [whether] the Government is
getting a "fair deal" under the contract."
I Id. at 1597. In other cases, the contractor supplemented this contention by arguing that the
access statutes should be construed narrowly because the former Renegotiation Act and the
Truth in Negotiations Act would have excluded the contracts at issue. See SmithKline Corp. v.
Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Staats, 574 F.2d at 916. In'making this argument, the company was citing the rule that "inter-
related statutory provisions should be given harmonious construction." SmithKline Corp. v.
Staats, 668 F.2d at 208; Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (stating rule). Other courts
had rejected this contention, reasoning that if Congress wished to harmonize these statutes, it
would have done so expressly. See Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1245 (Mikva, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (citing Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 916), aff'd sub nom., Bowsher v.
Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983)).
Indeed, a better application of the Belford principle would be to interpret the access statutes
broadly in light of the Comptroller General's wide-randing fiscal responsibilities under 31 U.S.C. §§
53, 60, 65 and 67 (1980). Accord, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 910-12. The Eli Lilly court
further highlighted the anomaly of denying inspection under the access statutes by stating "it is
likely that the Government could compel the same disclosure ... in discovery proceedings even in
litigation in which [Eli Lilly] is not a participant." Id. at 916.
1 103 S. Ct. 1597. See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968):
Production costs directly pertain to that subject matter [of the contract], because if out
of line with the contract price, the contract may have been an inappropriate means of
meeting this particular procurement need of the Government. While this appraisal could
not affect these particular contracts, it could lead to the use of other methods of meeting
future procurement needs. Production costs involve transactions relating to the con-
tract, because they encompass business arrangements made by the contractor in obtain-
ing the materials, labor, facilities, and the like required by it in fulfilling its commitment
with reference to the subject matter of the contract.
Unlike most courts, the Hewlett-Packard court contrasted the meaning of the statutory
language "directly pertinent to the contract" and "involving transactions relating to the contract."
Id. Taken literally, the latter phrase has broader application because it contains no words of
limitation. The above passage from Hewlett-Packard demonstrates that these phrases are very
close in meaning and overlap to a great extent. In Bowsher, the Supreme Court treated these
phrases as expressing one concept. 103 S. Ct. at 1592. Nonetheless, analyzing these terms as a
unitary concept violates the rule that a court generally will give meaning to every word in a
statute. American Textile Mfr. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1982) (stating principle).
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While the Court acknowledged that indirect costs also could substantially
influence contract price, the Court distinguished indirect cost records on two
grounds. First, following the Bristol test, the Court concluded that under
generally accepted accounting principles, the Comptroller General would find
it nearly impossible to attribute with any degree of certainty the portion of
unassigned indirect costs allocable to a specific government contract. 7 Conse-
quently, the Court reasoned, the Comptroller General would derive only a
marginal benefit from this inspection because allocation of such indirect costs
is largely arbitrary by definition."' Second, the Court stated that Comptroller
General examination of these indirect cost records necessarily entails wide-
ranging inspection of the contractor's unrelated business affairs. "We
therefore conclude that the appropriate balance of public and private in-
terests in this situation weighs in favor of access to direct cost records but
against access to Merck's indirect cost records." 9
The majority opinion then dismissed the government's objection that pro-
hibiting General Accounting Office access to indirect cost records hampers
the General Accounting Office from improving the procurement process. The
Government argued that this lack of access was particularly acute in the ins-
tant case because direct costs constituted only nine percent of the contract
price, thereby precluding Comptroller General review of most contract
costs. While recognizing the potential benefits of General Accounting Office
scrutiny in this situation, the Court answered that the "directly pertinent"
language foreclosed Comptroller General review of indirect costs. "[A]ny im-
pediment that our holding places in the path of the GAO's power to in-
vestigate fully government contracts is one Congress chose to adopt, and any
'T 103 S. Ct. at 1597; supra note 45.
103 S. Ct. at 1597.
Id. The Bowsher Court conceded the artificial nature of its "bright-line distinction" be-
tween direct and indirect costs and the Court stated in dicta that the Comptroller General could
discover indirect costs in limited situations. First, following Bristol, the Court would allow such
inspection where the contractor previously allocated these costs to a particular government con-
tract. Id. at 1596. Second, the Court would allow such inspection with cost-based contracts:
By claiming from the Government full reimbursement for these costs under the cost-
based contract, the contractor represents that these costs are justified as attributable to
the performance of the government contract, and not to any nongovernmental transac-
tions. Therefore, the public interest served by permitting the GAO to inspect records
supporting these claims clearly outweighs any privacy interests the contractor
possesses in those records.
Id. at 1597 n.17.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White observed that the Court also would probably permit
Comptroller General inspection of contractor indirect cost data when the Government enters a fix-
ed price contract based on the contractor's cost representations. Id. at 1606 n.21 (White, J., con-
curring and dissenting). In this situation, the contract is similarly cost-based. Id.
103 S. Ct. at 1597 n.20. Judge Mikva noted in his opinion below that the federal govern-
ment spends more than one billion dollars annually on pharmaceuticals. 665 F.2d at 1236. Conse-
quently, the Bowsher decision precludes review of the remaining nine hundred million dollars.
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arguments that this situation be changed must be addressed to Congress, not
the courts."'"
Finally, Justice O'Connor discussed Merck's contention that the General
Accounting Office's request was improper because the Comptroller General's
demand was unrelated to a congressionally authorized purpose. The Court re-
jected this view, concluding that the statutes' legislative history established
that the General Accounting Office may conduct a broad-based study of a par-
ticular industry to improve government procurement techniques.72 The Court
also dismissed the company's argument that the Comptroller General's re-
quest was tainted because two senators encouraged the Comptroller General
to invoke his inspection authority. "If the records sought by the GAO are
within the scope of the access to records statute, the fact that the Comp-
troller General's request had its origin in the requests of congressmen or
that the GAO reported the data to Congress does not vitiate its authority."'73
C. Justice White's Opinion
Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion concurring in
the Court's holding permitting General Accounting Office inspection of con-
tractor direct cost records but dissenting from the majority's prohibiting
General Accounting Office access to Merck's indirect cost data.74 Like the ma-
jority, Justice White first examined the statutory language. He reached a
broader interpretation of "directly pertinent," arguing: "It is hard to imagine
anything more directly related to a contract than the cost of producing the
items covered by it or the matters going into the makeup of the price."75
71 Id. at 1598. Before Bowsher, the Seventh Circuit was the only circuit expressly allowing
Comptroller General review of contractor indirect cost data. United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, 597 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1979); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978). The Eli Lilly court reasoned that indirect costs could be directly perti-
nent to a government contract when they were a "significant input" in the cost of the product. Id.
at 914-15. The Seventh Circuit thus required contractor disclosure of indirect costs regardless of
allocation. Id. The Eli Lilly court further acknowledged that the direct pertinence of such data
necessarily varies from case to case. Id. at 914.
Arguably, the Ninth Circuit in Hewlett-Packard also had followed the Eli Lilly view. See
Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1248 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring and
dissenting), aff'd sub nom., Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. 1587 (1983). The Second Circuit
and the Third Circuit adopted the Bristol distinction between direct and indirect costs. Bristol
Laboratories Div. of Bristol Myers Co. v. Staats, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), affd by an evenly
divided Court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981); SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
" 103 S. Ct. at 1598. Accord, SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 206; Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Staats, 574 F.2d at 909-10. Examples of such improvements would be obtaining greater competi-
tion in future similar procurements or negotiating contracts more carefully. Bowsher v. Merck
and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1600 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
"' Id. at 1599. Accord, SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 688 F.2d at 207.
" Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1599-1606 (1983).
11 Id. at 1600-01 (quoting Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 913). Justice White also
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Justice White thus concluded that the statutory language standing alone
could support the Comptroller General's demand for Merck's indirect cost
data because "[iln some instances indirect costs have a critical bearing on the
makeup of the contract price.""6
Although he believed such examination unnecessary, Justice White
turned to the statutes' legislative history. He agreed with the majority that
one broad congressional purpose was to enable the Comptroller General to
evaluate government procurement techniques." Additionally, Justice White
quoted several portions from the legislative debates indicating that
Representative Hoffman's amendment was largely insignificant and might
have been a "sop to the bill's opponents."78 In contrast to the majority,
Justice White indicated that Representative Hoffman's amendment
represented a subsidiary congressional purpose, namely, to prevent General
Accounting Office access to contractor cost data having no significant impact
on government contracts.79
Justice White took particular issue with the majority's adoption of the
Bristol indirect cost/direct cost dichotomy. He fully agreed with the Govern-
ment's position that the indirect cost/direct cost test creates an artificial
distinction frequently restricting the Government's ability to examine
critical price data.8 Justice White therefore proposed another interpretation
of "directly pertinent to the contract": "the records are of costs that likely
criticized the majority for failing to apply its definition of "directly pertinent" to nonallocable cost
records: "[T]here is of course no reason why the records of all indirect costs inherently lack the re-
quisite "close connection." 103 S. Ct. at 1601 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Eli
Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 914:
The mere fact that, as plaintiff asserts, it does not or even could not allocate costs such
as research and development to an individual contract does not undercut the proposition
that those costs are directly pertinent to an individual contract but merely indicates
that they are directly pertinent to more than one individual contract.
78 103 S. Ct. at 1601.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1603. The majority responded to this argument by observing that the "[Congres-
sional] majority voted for the Hoffman amendment and we must give weight to the expressed will
of a legislative majority." Id. at 1594 n.10.
Id. at 1603.
1 Id. at 1604. Justice White gave an example of how the Bristol standard impairs the Comp-
troller General's ability to remedy extravagance or inefficiency in government procurement:
[T]he Bristol test might not allow the GAO to examine a contractor's records of adver-
tising costs. One would imagine that, if the GAO were aware that a great percentage of
the cost of the products of a certain company went to support a large advertising cam-
paign, rather than, say, to maintain quality control, the GAO might recommend to the
contracting agency that it not deal with the company in the future. Yet, under the
Bristol test, the GAO might not be able to obtain the information needed to make such a
recommendation.
Id. at 1604 n.17.
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had a direct and substantial impact on the price charged to the Government
under the contract."'"
Finally, Justice White justified his reading of the access statutes by
noting that the fourth amendment to the Constitution restricts the govern-
ment's subpoena power over corporate documents by limiting General Ac-
couting Office access to those records "reasonably related" to the agency's
requirements.2 In this regard, he commented that Merck could successfully
modify the General Accounting Office's demand if the company established
that government inspection would involve either undue company expense or
unwarranted interference with its operations.' Based on the foregoing
reasoning, he offered the following standard for General Accounting Office
access to contractor cost records: "1) the records sought by the GAO related
" Id. at 1605. The majority rejected Justice White's formulation in part because his approach
was "unworkable for both the Government and the contractors." Id. at 1597 n.18. The Court failed
to document this assertion, except to speculate that Justice White's test would lead to the col-
lateral problem of "protracted litigation." Id. Additionally, the Court's response gives insufficient
deference to agency judgment in matters committed to its special expertise. See SEC v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981); Dresser Indus. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980) (stating rule). See also Merck and Co. v. Staats,
665 F.2d at 1249 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The test of 'directly pertinent' is not the
number of documents an industry must furnish, or the relative burden of doing so, but whether
those documents will assist the government to determine whether its negotiating practices suffi-
ciently protect it from wasteful, fraudulent, or inefficient procurement practices.")
In turn, Justice White criticized the majority's bright line cost distinction as creating the
possibility "that the contractor can avoid a GAO examination of even product-specific records in
those areas by arbitrarily refusing to attribute these costs to the specific products." 103 S. Ct. at
1605 n.18. The majority responded to this point by observing that the Government obtains a
"windfall" when the contractor makes the extra effort of identifying indirect costs attributable to
a government contract. Id. at 1596-97 n.16. "Given this added benefit to the Government, it is
anomalous to argue that its access authority is being 'limited' by the contractor's accounting
method." Id. See also infra note 131 (discussing contractor's general obligation in negotiated pro-
curements to distinguish and allocate direct and indirect costs).
" 103 S. Ct. at 1605-06. The majority rejected this analysis, commenting "If, however, Con-
gress had intended that GAO demands be limited only by the Fourth Amendment, it need not
have concerned itself with requiring that records be directly pertinent to the contract." Id. at 1594
n.10. This critique misstates Justice White's position because he clearly saw the fourth amend-
ment as an additional safeguard rather than as a restatement of the phrase "directly pertinent."
Id. 1605-06.
The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination offers little assistance
to companies contesting a General Accounting Office subpoena. Corporations have no privilege
against self-incrimination, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), and the "dual purpose" doc-
trine permits enforcement of a subpoena, despite a wrongful purpose, if the agency also shows a
valid justification. Lynn v. Biderman, 536 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). Ac-
cordingly, the General Accounting Office could enforce the subpoena if the request has a single
valid civil purpose, even if the request also was intended to gather information for a possible
criminal prosecution, cf. id.; United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
1 103 S. Ct. at 1606.
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to costs that likely had a direct and substantial impact on the [contract price]
and 2) the request is reasonable in scope and would not unduly burden [the
contractor]."'
D. Justice Blackmun's Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote an opinion concurring
in the Court's refusal to allow General Accounting Office inspection of
Merck's indirect cost data but dissenting from the Court's holding authoriz-
ing Comptroller General review of the contractor's direct cost records."
Justice Blackmun agreed with Merck that cost records were not "directly
pertinent" to these non-cost based contracts because the government never
requested any cost data and the agreements were negotiated without regard
to costs.86 Like Justice White, Justice Blackmun saw little need to consult the
statutes' legislative history. By contrast, however, he argued that the
statutory language "gave the Comptroller General access to a narrow
category of records: those directly pertinent to the contracts between the
Government and its contracting partner."8 Consequently, Justice Blackmun
would permit Comptroller General access only when the request relates "to
the contract's negotiation, its terms, or its performance."'
Justice Blackmun then criticized the majority for using an expansive
definition of "contract" in holding that direct cost data fall within the inspec-
tion statutes. Noting that the majority opinion used the terms "contract" and
"product" interchangeably, 9 he argued that the word "contract" must be in-
terpreted as taking the ordinary legal meaning because the statutes contain
nothing to the contrary. In Justice Blackmun's view, the majority's expan-
sive definition allows unwarranted General Accounting Office access: the
traditional definition of "contract" would permit government inspection of
only those items directly related to the contract's negotiation, terms, or its
performance. 1 By expanding "contract" to include "product", Justice
Blackmun believed that the majority opinion allows General Accounting Of-
fice inquiry into matters "[n]ot mentioned in the bargaining process and
play[ing] no part in the agreement ultimately reached."9 Thus, he saw little
4Id.
Id. at 1606 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 1607 and 1610.
Id at 1607.
Id. at 1608.
Id. at 1607.
Id. at 1608 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)) ("unless otherwise de-
fined, statutory terms take on their ordinary legal meaning"). In its ordinary legal meaning, "a
contract is a legally enforceable bargain formed by mutual consent and supported by considera-
tion." 103 S. Ct. at 1608 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979)).
1 103 S. Ct. at 1608.
9Id.
[Vol. 86
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss2/6
BOWSHER v. MERCK
difference in granting the Comptroller General access to direct or indirect
cost data: "Because the Government chose not to make costs an issue during
the negotiations, the terms of the contract would have been the same
whether Merck's costs represented one percent, ten percent, or one hundred
percent of the price the Government agreed to pay.""3
Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by stating:
I would hold that when the terms of the contract are not tied to costs and the
contractor makes no representations about costs during its negotiations with
the Government, cost records do not "directly pertain to and involve transac-
tions relating to the contract" and are not subject to inspection by the Comp-
troller General. The only records "directly pertinent" to such a contract would
be those necessary to verify the terms of the contract and the representations
upon which the contract was based. 4
IV. ANALYSIS OF BOWSHER v. MERCK AND CO.
A. The Majority Opinion
Following precedent, Justice O'Connor correctly focused on the wording
of the access to records statutes as the first step in ascertaining the
legislative intent.95 The majority quickly concluded that the words "directly
pertinent and involving transactions relating to the contract" lack specificity
and the Court therefore resorted to the congressional debates and related
legislative history. Other courts, however, had concluded that the language
of the access statutes does provide helpful guidance. In Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Staats,9 the Seventh Circuit implicitly relied on the axiom that Congress or-
dinarily intends that words take on their usual legal meaning in legislative
enactments.' The Eli Lilly court indicated that the word "direct", although
difficult to apply in specific situations, usually denotes that something has a
"logical, causal, and consequential relationship" to the ultimate issue. 8 Since
the Bowsher Court conceded that Merck's nonallocated costs had a substan-
tial connection to contract price, the Court should have given more heed to
"direct's" traditional legal meaning.9
The majority opinion gave undue weight to Representative Hoffman's
amendment and his comments during the legislative debates. The Court
11 Id. at 1609.
94 Id.
1 E.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980) (statutory construction begins with the statutory language).
11 574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979).
'Id.
Id. at 914.
The customary meaning of a statutory term takes on even greater importance where, as
here, the legislative history is arguably ambiguous. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, 404
U.S. 116 (1971).
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termed "authoritative" his statements on the "anti-snooping" policy behind
his amendment."' By contrast, other courts and commentators had concluded
that Representative Hoffman's "anti-snooping" comments are actually highly
ambiguous.1 ' Further, the Court's reliance on his comments contravenes
established canons .of statutory construction. The Court has observed on
other occasions that the "contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who
sponsors a bill are not to be controlling in analyzing legislative history." '
Contrary to the Bowsher analysis, the correct mode is to examine all aspects
of a bill's progress through Congress, giving appropriate weight to all rele-
vant considerations."0 ' In this case, the total record shows that Represen-
tative Hoffman was basically an opponent-not a sponsor-of this bil10 ' and
his comments as an opponent should carry little weight in determining the
legislative meaning.01 Indeed, Representative Hoffman's sole contribution as
"4sponsor" was to insert "directly" before "pertinent"; the full record
establishes that Representative Hoffman's sole reason for proposing this
change was to prevent General Accounting Office rummaging in contractor
business minimally relevant to government contracts.1 0 As Judge Mikva
stated in his opinion below, Representative Hoffman's amendment actually
restated Representative Hardy's own position.107 Consequently, the majority
distorted the legislative history by terming the Hoffman amendment a dual
aim of the access statutes. On the contrary, the total legislative history
shows that Congress' paramount reason for enacting this bill was to allow the
Comptroller General to examine all matters having a significant impact on
"® The Court supported this assertion with the rule that a sponsor's explanation of the
statutory language "is an authoritative guide to the statute's construction." 103 S. Ct. at 1593
(quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982)).
1"' In actuality, Representative Hoffman's references to Comptroller General "snooping" and
related matters are unclear. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 916 n.8; Note, Eli Lilly and Co.
v. Staats, supra note 20, at 136. Indeed, at one point, Representative Hoffman stated that he
wished to "limit the snooping that may be carried on under this bill which we do not have the
votes to defeat." Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1249 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting 97 CONG. REC. 13377 (1951)) (emphasis added by the court). Thus, the legislative history
arguably supports the conclusion that Congress gave little, if any, weight to Representative Hoff-
man's "anti-snooping" concerns.
10 Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980).
10 Id.; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
10 See 97 CONG. REC. at 13373-77 (1951).
105 National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639-40 (1967);
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951).
10 See supra text accompanying note 33; Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1603
(White, J., concurring and dissenting).
10 Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1249 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting). In fact,
strong evidence exists that Representative Hardy, not Representative Hoffman, originated the
"directly pertinent" modification. Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1602 n.6 (White, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (analyzing 97 CONG. REC. at 13377).
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government procurement; the secondary goal was to prohibit General Ac-
counting Office infringement of contractor business privacy. '
Given this reading of the legislative history, the Court properly could
have relied on several other maxims of statutory construction to allow broad
Comptroller General inspection. In Platt v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company,"9 the Supreme Court ruled that a court may give determinative
weight to a statute's primary goal as opposed to a secondary policy where im-
plementation of the latter objective would impair the basic operation of the
statute.10 Other canons support a similar result."1 Thus, even assuming that
the words "directly pertinent" have a limiting affect, the Bowsher Court had
ample precedent to effectuate the inspection statute's primary policy over its
secondary motive.
While stating that a sponsor's comments are "authoritative", the
majority opinion also gave insufficient weight to Representative Hardy's ex-
planations during the debates on these statutes. As primary sponsor,
Representative Hardy offered several examples demonstrating the extreme-
ly broad reach of the Comptroller General's audit powers. For instance,
Representative Hardy discussed a hypothetical situation in which the
government bought parts from an automobile dealer who in turn purchased
these parts from another dealer. According to Representative Hardy, his bill
would enable the Comptroller General to inspect the prime contractor's "ad-
ministrative" and handling costs as well as the subcontractor's profits.1 This
example shows conclusively that Representative Hardy envisioned Comp-
troller General access to all cost records having a substantial connection to
contract price, including the very same indirect "administrative" costs the
Bowsher Court excluded from statutory coverage. Although the majority
opinion quoted the above example to illustrate the legislative purpose, the
Court failed to apply the underlying principle in the instant case.
Justice O'Connor pointedly criticized the government's definition of
,OS 103 S. Ct. at 1601-03 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
99 U.S. 48 (1878).
Il Id. at 65-66.
l Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1897) (A statute should be interpreted in light of its
fundamental rule and policy and the remedy it was designed to create; a court should apply this
rule rather than regarding the subtle signification of words and the niceties of verbal distinctions);
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968) (A remedial statute should be broadly construed); Bob
Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 (1983) ("[A] court should go beyond the
literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the
statute .... )
1 97 CONG. REc. 13198 (1951). See also id at 13372. (Representative Hardy indicating
General Accounting Office's broad authority to examine a government subcontractor's complete
records unless subcontractor supplied a minimally relevant item incident to primary contract).
"1 103 S. Ct. at 1593 n.9.
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"directly pertinent" as containing "no doctrinal limitation.""1 ' The Court
might have mischaracterized the government's position because the General
Accounting Office conceded that indirect costs must relate to the contract.115
More accurately, the government's formulation might be overbroad because
its definition often has few practical limitations: the Comptroller General fre-
quently needs total access to a contractor's cost records because the com-
pany's records may contain no breakdown for government and nongovern-
ment contracts."6 This accounting practice thus presents a dilemma for the
courts. As one commentator points out, "there can be no accommodation of
the competing interests" when the Comptroller General requests inspection
of indirect costs; "the GAO gets all of the information or it gets none of it."",
Since the statutes preclude a compromise solution, the Court should have
allowed inspection in light of the statutes' overriding "pro-disclosure bias."'1 8
The Court adopted the Bristol distinction between direct and indirect
costs in construing the Comptroller General's audit powers."9 The Court also
stated that it was analyzing the Comptroller General's inspection authority
as a matter of statutory interpretation as opposed to examining the intention
of the parties. 20 These two statements are inconsistent because the Bristol
test is founded on an erroneous attempt to ascertain the intent of the con-
tractor and the United States. As the Bristol court stated:
Although the access to records clause has its origins in statute, it is never-
theless a contractual provision. We are thus confronted with the task of con-
struing the contracts, a task which turns on the intent and understanding of
the parties regarding the import of the access to records clause at the time
the contract was entered.121
The Bristol court's emphasis on the intent of the parties is incorrect because
"[w]hen a clause is included [in a contract] by reason of congressional com-
"' Id. at 1595.
115 Id.
116 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
II Note, Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, supra note 20, at 139.
n" Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1250 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting).
19 103 S. Ct. at 1596-97.
12 Id. at 1591 n.6. But see id. at 1604 n.13 ("[Contractors like Merck... had no reason to ex-
pect that consenting to inclusion of the access-to-records clause would subject their business to [in-
spection of indirect cost records]"). This passage tracks similar language in Bristol. See infra note
121 and accompanying text.
Assuming that the contractor's intention is relevant, the company entered the agreement
with knowledge of the clause and constructive knowledge, at least, of the Government's inter-
pretation in Hewlett-Packard. Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1248 (Mikva, J., concurring
and dissenting); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 918.
1 428 F. Supp. 1388, 1390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an
equally divided Couirt, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
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mand, rather than as the result of contractual negotiations, the proper focus
of inquiry is the intent of Congress."1
The Bristol test is also unsatisfactory because its direct/indirect cost
dichotomy is uncertain, overly mechanical and encourages contractors to ad-
just their books to frustrate Comptroller General review. Regarding the
uncertainty, the Bristol test by definition includes overhead as a direct cost
of manufacturing the particular item.1  Like indirect costs, however,
overhead is usually non-allocable to any one product." By definition, the
Bristol test avoids any examination of the facts or equities of a particular
case.12 Consequently, the Bowsher decision clearly obligates future courts to
apply its holding in a mechanical manner. 26 This rigidity is highly ques-
tionable because the phrase "directly pertinent" indicates great flexibility. 2 '
The Bristol test also encourages contractor circumvention of the statute
because the test contains one large exception for indirect costs the company
previously attributed to a government contract." This exception opens a
possible loophole because contractors might then adjust their books to lump
together costs of government and nongovernment contracts." The instant
litigation exemplifies how companies even with million dollar contracts fail to
maintain separate books on their accounts. 3 ' The Bowsher decision thus pro-
vides companies with even less incentive to maintain separate indirect cost
data for items produced incident to federal contracts."'
11 Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1248 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting). In sup-
port of this statement, Judge Mikva cited G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 345
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963). In Christian, the court held that a contractor was sub-
ject to a statutorily-required clause that the government contracting officer inadvertently had
omitted from the solicitation. The Christian court read the clause into the contract as a matter of
law, even though the parties obviously never actually contemplated its application. Id. By its
terms, the Christian doctrine would almost certainly require the incorporation of the access to
records clause if the agency omitted it from the solicitation. Id.
12 428 F. Supp. at 1389-91.
,14 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 913.
2 SmithKline v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 212.
12 103 S. Ct. at 1596 and 1597 n.18.
12 See supra notes 48 and 112 and accompanying text.
II 428 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
' Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1597 n.18 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
The government must normally accept the contractor's accounting system when this procedure
accords with generally accepted accounting principles. Cf. Department of the Army Pamphlet
27-153, Procurement Law, p. 6-3 (stating standard).
"I Judge Mikva noted in his opinion below that Merck had performed profitability ac-
counting studies on other products regarding unallocated costs, even though the company
disclaimed them as "essentially arbitrary." 665 F.2d at 1250 n.33. This case illustrates that Merck
attempted allocation of indirect costs only when such studies served the company's best interests.
"1' 103 S. Ct. at 1596. But see the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2169
(1976) which subjects most negotiated prime and subcontract acquisitions exceeding $100,000 to
uniform cost accounting standards. Id. at § 2168. One standard is that defense contractors must
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Finally, the majority opinion failed to give sufficient weight to the princi-
ple that the courts will give great deference to the long-standing construction
of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement unless the agency is
clearly wrong.1" The Court avoided this principle in part because the General
Accounting Office had allegedly rendered inconsistent interpretations of its
statutory powers before Congress.'3 The Seventh Circuit in Eli Lilly and Co.
v. Staats1 " had examined the same legislative history and reached a contrary
assessment that the Comptroller General's views were consistent."' 3 The
Bowsher Court also avoided the rule of deference by stating that the Comp-
troller General's interpretation "is inconsistent with the statutory
language." ' This comment contradicts the Court's earlier statement that
"the statutory language does not tell us exactly which records are subject to
GAO examination."'
'
B. Justice White's Opinion
In contrast to the majority and Justices Blackmun and Stevens, Justice
White consistently employed a functional interpretation of the Comptroller
General's inspection power. Justice White's broad reading of the access
statutes accords with another established canon of statutory construction: if
a statute has two valid interpretations, a court should adopt that interpreta-
tion closest to the policies of the enactment and mischief it seeks to
prevent."s
Justice White initially criticized the majority for devoting inadequate at-
tention to the literal wording of the statute."9 Although the majority termed
disclose in writing their cost accounting practices, including the contractor's method of
distinguishing direct and indirect costs. Id. Merck's books were outside the Act because the
statute contains an exemption for catalog or market price items sold in substantial quantities to
the general public. Id. at § 2168(g). Of course, a contractor may properly nonallocate certain in-
direct costs to government contracts if this practice accords with generally accepted accounting
principles. See supra notes 45 and 129.
The SmithKline court commented that the Bristol test would have little effect on the Comp-
troller General's ability to inspect contractor cost records "in industries where direct costs are the
prime component of the price, where firms are producers of only one product, or where the firms
sell almost everything they make to the government .... 668 F.2d at 213 n.8.
m See supra note 62.
1 See supra note 63.
574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1978).
l Id. at 915. (General Accounting Office had made a consistent interpretation of its access
authority). But see Bowsher v. Merck and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1604 n.13 (White, J., concurring and
dissenting) (agreeing with majority that the General Accounting Office had rendered inconsistent
interpretations).
II 103 S. Ct. at 1595.
a Id. at 1592 n.7.
I United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 75-76 (1838).
103 S. Ct. at 1600 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
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"legislation" Justice White's interpretation of "directly pertinent," ' the ma-
jority's own analysis of the phrase is equally subject to this criticisim. The
statutes fail to detail the class of discoverable records and the statutes cer-
tainly contain no express distinction between direct and indirect costs.
Justice White's closer reading of the full legislative history also discloses the
secondary importance of Representative Hoffman's amendment and its true
intention to prohibit only Comptroller General inspection of cost data
minimally relevant to government procurement.'
Justice White's statutory construction is superior to the majority's ver-
sion. His proposed formulation of the Controller General's audit power finds
greater support in the statutes and their history and his standard is more
realistic than the majority's rigid direct cost/indirect cost distinction. Justice
White's test recognizes the realities of modern business because indirect
costs can play a far more critical role than direct costs in determining con-
tract price."' Justice White's interpretation also gives adequate protection to
contractor business privacy concerns, requiring the General Accounting Of-
fice to establish a substantial relationship between the requested record and
the contract and to refrain from causing the company-undue expense or
disruption during a Comptroller General audit."' In sum, Justice White's
. Id. at 1594 n.10. In rejecting Justice White's interpretation, the Court relied on Congress'
rebuff in the 1970's of several bills expanding General Accounting Office access authority. Id.; see
also id. at 1595 n.12. Other courts, however, have noted the canon of statutory construction that
subsequent legislative history ordinarily carries very little weight in the interpretation of an
earlier statute. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 916; SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at
206 (citing United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947)); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 332 n.24 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980)).
41 103 S. Ct. 1602-03 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White never squarely ad-
dressed the majority's argument that the words "directly pertinent" limit the Comptroller
General's access power based on the principle that a reviewing court will give effect, if possible, to
every word of a statute. 103 S. Ct. at 1593 (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De
La Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982)). The response would be that the "directly pertinent"
language has a secondary meaning in light of the statute's predominant disclosure policy. See
supra text accompanying notes 109-120.
I" Id. at 1601, 1604-05. Accord, Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 913. Justice White
noted that in the drug industry, direct costs amount to as little as nine percent of the contract
price. 103 S. Ct. at 1604. Denying the Comptroller General access to the great preponderance of
the company's cost data thus makes it "[i]mpossible for the GAO to make an accurate assessment
of the fairness of the prices and ... the adequacy of the Government's procurement technique."
Id.; accord, Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting).
143 103 S. Ct. at 1606 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White would place the
burden on the government of proving the pertinence of contractor cost records. Id. at 1605. This
burden allocation would frequently defeat government access because "the burden of showing
that such costs are irrelevant must fall on [the company] because only [it] has all the data
necessary to make such a showing." Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1250 (Mikva, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
Justice White failed to consider that a broad Comptroller General inspection power could
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practical reading of the access statutes supports the statutes' remedial intent
and his proposed standard deters contractors from obtaining an unfair advan-
tage during the procurement process, the very mischief the statutes seek to
prevent. 4
C. Justice Blackmun's Opinion
Justice Blackmun employed a formalistic approach that obstructs the
broad congressional purpose of "equaliz[ing] the relationship between the
government and private contractors."1" Justice Blackmun properly criticized
the majority for interchanging "contract" with "product" and he correctly
noted that the latter term would allow broader Comptroller General access.'4
Nevertheless, his technical criticisms of the majority analysis have only
limited validity. He neglected to mention that the majority clearly tied direct
cost records to contract price,147 which is indeed a term of the contract. Con-
sequently, direct cost data fall within even Justice Blackmun's definition of
discoverable records under the statutes.
Justice Blackmun's narrow reading of the access statutes is weak in
other areas. Justice Blackmun adopted Merck's theory thatthe Comptroller
General may inspect contractor cost records only when the contract is cost
based or when the parties discussed costs during contract negotiations."
This test conflicts with the statute, which evidences no limitation to cost-
based contracts or to contracts negotiated with reference to costs."' The Eli
Lilly court had specifically rejected this latter argument, commenting:
prompt potential contractors to avoid bidding on government contracts or to raise their prices to
comply with the increased scope of potential General Accounting Office audits. See Comment,
Private Business Records, supra note 20, at 1159 n.70. This result is unlikely, however, because
government contracts are usually quite profitable and contractors know that the Comptroller
General audits only a small percentage of all government procurements. See supra note 5.
." A related situation as yet unaddressed concerns contractor cost data with inextricably in-
termixed discoverable and nondiscoverable information. In this setting, the Comptroller General
should have total access authority to effectuate the statutory purpose. Cf. SCHNITZER supra note 5
at 9 (noting similar result in Department of Defense audits).
... Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting). Con-
ceivably, Justice Blackmun's opinion and, to a lesser extent, the majority opinion's narrow reading
of the Comptroller General's inspection authority reflects the "generalized perception, among
scholars and businessmen alike, that the GAO has come to exercise more authority ... than was
ever intended by Congress." Comment, Private Business Records, supra note 20, at 1158. The
courts also have recognized the General Accounting Office's uncertain legal authority over private
parties and even over members of the Executive Branch. Id. at 1155-56 nn. 56-57 (collecting cases).
. 103 S. Ct. at 1607-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun also
remarked that the Ninth Circuit in Hewlett-Packard had used a similarly broad definition of con-
tract. Id. at n.2.
... Id. at 1597 ("these costs ... have a very direct influence on the price charged the Govern-
ment .... ) (emphasis added).
I' d. at 1607.
19 E.g., Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1243 (Mikva, J. concurring and dissenting);
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[Eli Lilly's] proposed method of defining pertinence by analyzing what was
negotiated would not serve even its interests in the long run because such a
standard once adopted would simply encourage the Government to protract
the negotiations by raising any conceivable issue which it later might want in-
formation and would allow the Government to make an issue pertinent simply
by introducing it in the negotiations. 11
In effect, Justice Blackmun's proposed test for cost data narrows the
Comptroller General's statutory inquiry from" 'directly pertinent' to the con-
tract" to "'directly pertinent' to the negotiation." '5 Contrary to Justice
Blackmun's technical interpretation, Judge Mikva in his lower court opinion
emphasized the business reality that contracts negotiated without regard to
costs create a prime danger that the government will suffer a tremendous
competitive disadvantage. 2 Economists have noted that standard commer-
cial prices can be a faulty guarantee of fair pricing because standard prices
frequently result from non-competitive oligopolistic practices.s' Finally,
Justice Blackmun's proposed standard is deficient because the terms of
Merck's contract contained the statutory requirement that the company in-
clude the access statute as a provision in its subcontracts.'" "The express re-
quirement concerning access to subcontract records is manifestly a cost and
pricing item, and should have made Merck aware that cost records would be
considered pertinent to its negotiated, fixed price contract.""'5
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
988 (1968); SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 208.
574 F.2d at 914.
5 Id. The absence of competition can be particularly acute in the drug industry, especially
considering the large number of patented items belonging to single companies. For example, in
Eli Lilly, the court noted that six of the contracts were negotiated on a sole source basis. 574 F.2d
at 907. In a sole source procurement, the government activity determines, after testing the
market, that only one offeror can meet the government's minimum needs on a particular acquisi-
tion. Defense Acquisition Regulation 3-210; California Microwave, Inc., B-180954, 74-2 CPD 181
(1974). By definition, therefore, price considerations are nearly absent in sole source procure-
ments. One authority has noted that sole source procurements amounted to 79.2 billion dollars in
fiscal year 1982, more than half of all procurement dollars spent in that time period. See PERLMAN,
SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTS, GOVERNIENT CONTRACTOR BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (July 1983).
" Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1241 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge
Mikva also commented:
No single purchaser of drugs is anywhere near as large or as non-competitively situated
as is the United States government .... It is too little appreciated that government, in a
number of ways, may often require far greater protection in the marketplace than
private individuals .... [The inherent non-corrupt, non-fraudulent disadvantages that
government often has in dealing with private contractors are only beginning to be
understood. The very size of government purchases, and the necessity thereof, may
make the traditional marketplace shields ineffective.
Id. at 1245-46.
1 Id. at 1245 and n.23. Accord, Eli Lilly and Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 915.
. See supra notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text.
'0 Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1244 n.19 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting); ac-
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V. PROPOSED STATUTE
The following proposed statute incorporates the reforms suggested
throughout this Article:
Subject to dollar thresholds set by agency regulations, all government con-
tracts shall provide that the Comptroller General and his representatives are
entitled, until the expiration of three years after final payment, to examine
any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or any of his sub-
contractors, that likely have a substantial connection to the contract.
(1) The Comptroller General and his representatives may examine the
above materials regardless of whether the contractor or subcontractor
previously allocated its costs to a particular contract.
(2) The Comptroller General's right of access may include but is not
limited to such matters as costs of material, labor, manufacturing, overhead,
advertising, royalties, delivery, research and development, marketing and pro-
motion, distribution, administration, and taxes.
(3) Contractor or subcontractor materials may be discoverable under this
section although these materials are intermixed with otherwise non-
discoverable materials.
(4) The contractor or subcontractor has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the requested materials are outside the
scope of this Section.
(5) If the contractor or subcontractor contests in whole or part a Comp-
troller General inspection demand, a United States district court may limit in
its discretion the Comptroller General's right of access to the above materials
if the contractor or subcontractor offers evidence that the Comptroller
General's demand would entail unreasonable expense, undue disruption of its
business operations, or both.
A. Commentary
The proposed statute corrects existing deficiencies in 10 United States
Code section 2313(b) and 41 United States Code section 254(c). On their face,
the present access statutes cover all negotiated government contracts even
though agency regulations typically set a $10,000 threshold. The proposal
eliminates some confusion by referring expressly to pertinent agency regula-
tions. Second, the proposal includes both negotiated and formally advertised
contracts. This reform is necessary because the Comptroller General pre-
sently has no effective means to inspect contractor cost records incident to
cord, SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 208-09. The term "subcontractor" covers only first
tier subcontractors. SHNITZER, supra note 5, at 5. Although the access statutes exclude formally
advertised prime contracts, the statutes cover subcontracts regardless of contract type. Id. at 6.
The clause may be excluded, however, for subcontracts concerning general inventory items or
contracts below $10,000. Id. If a prime contractor improperly omitted the clause from a subcon-
tract, a court would very likely include the clause in the subcontract as a matter of law under the
Christian doctrine. Id.; see supra note 122.
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formally advertised prime government contracts."' Although the statutes ex-
clude these contracts because Congress believed that the greater competition
guarantees fair pricing, the courts now realize that market prices can also be
unreasonable. 7 Further, this reform finds support in other regulations and
statutes. For example, Defense Acquisition Regulation 7-104.41 (a) grants the
Department of Defense the right to audit all formally advertised contracts
over $100,000."1 Also, the access statutes themselves permit Comptroller
General examination of subcontractor cost records relative to formally adver-
tised subcontracts."' Thus, the proposal broadens the Comptroller General's
inspection powers consistent with his statutory fiscal responsibilities."
The model statute also improves on current law by rejecting the Bristol
test and by incorporating Justice White's suggestion that the Comptroller
General have access to all cost data that likely had a substantial impact on
contract price. Although Justice White used the phrase "direct and substan-
tial impact" on contract price, the proposal drops "direct" because this word
is potentially misleading and indeed allowed the Bowsher Court to employ a
narrow construction of the access statutes. The proposal further recognizes
the contractor's right to business privacy by excluding Comptroller General
review of records minimally relevant to government procurement. Similarly,
the proposal permits the district court discretion to modify the Comptroller
General's access if the contractor establishes that the General Accounting Of-
fice demand is unreasonable. Finally, the model statute places the burden on
the contractor of showing that the requested records are outside the boun-
daries of the Comptroller General's audit authority. This reform recognizes
the impracticality of placing this burden on the Comptroller General because
only the contractor has the data necessary for such a showing.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The access statutes and their legislative history evidence a "pro-
"' The federal government may also audit contractor records under such statutes and regula-
tions as the Truth in Negotiations Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1976), Defense Acquisition Regulation
7-104.41(a), and Federal Procurement Regulation 1-3.809. Unfortunately, the agencies involved
have the major responsibility of enforcing these directives, which are also fairly limited in
coverage. See supra note 42. Thus, the Comptroller General presently faces substantial barriers
in conducting systemic reviews of federal procurement.
The federal government lost a substantial deterrent to contractor fraud, waste, and abuse
with the demise of the Renegotiation Board. See supra note 42. The government's diminished
ability to recoup excess profits now makes the Comptroller General's inspection power an even
more important weapon in the arsenal against improper contractor practices. See also id. (discuss-
ing other civil and criminal sanctions against contractors).
,5, See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
,c' See supra notes 1-3.
'G, See supra note 143.
1984]
29
Feldman: The Comptroller General's Authority to Examine Contractor Books a
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
disclosure bias."1 2 As Judge Mikva stated in his lower court opinion, "The
public business ought to be public; the government's right to know the costs
incurred by its contractors is as important as the public's right to know the
costs incurred by its government." The Bowsher Court's adoption of the
Bristol test is an inadequate reconstruction of the legislative intent. The
Court's test therefore frustrates the overriding Congressional purpose of
allowing Comptroller General scrutiny of contractor cost data having a
significant connection to contract price.'"
Justice White's basic formulation better advances the avowed legislative
purpose of equalizing the competitive relationship between the federal
government and private contractors. The proposed statute also attempts to
improve on Justice White's test in several ways. First, the model statute ap-
plies to all procurements regardless of contract type. Second, the proposal re-
quires the contractor to show the unreasonableness of the Comptroller
General's demand because only the contractor has access to the requisite in-
formation.
Finally, the Bowsher majority opinion indicated that Congress could
overrule the decision by enacting appropriate legislation. 1' In the author's
view, Congress should accept the challenge and modify the access statutes to
enhance the Comptroller General's inspection power commensurate with his
legislative mandate.
1"2 Merck and Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1250 (Mikva, J., concurring and dissenting).
i Id.
I" It bears emphasis that Bowsher decided only the scope of Comptroller General review in
fixed price negotiated government contracts. See supra notes 40-42. In dicta, the Court indicated
that the Comptroller General has far greater inspection power in cost based procurements. See
supra note 69.
103 S. Ct. at 1598. Indeed, the Bowsher Court indicated that the Government could prop-
erly require total inspection of a contractor's books as a condition of the contract. Id. at 1591 n.6.
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